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I.

Jurisdiction of the Court.
The jurisdiction of this Court is pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996

Supp.).
II.

Nature of the Proceedings.
The Defendants appeal the Trial Court's denial of their Motion for Relief from

Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(b), Utah R. of Civ. P.
III.

Statement of the Issues and Standard of Review.
Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying the Defendants' Motion for

Relief from Judgment, where said motion was filed more than ninety (90) days after entry
of judgment? The Trial Court has discretion in ruling on Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) motions
for relief from judgment and that discretion will only be set aside where there has been
an abuse of discretion. Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989). See also
Larsen v. Collina. 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984).
IV.

Statement of the Case,
A.

Nature of the Case.
The pending matter involves a civil action filed by Plaintiff to renew and

enforce a judgment taken against the Defendant Lynn E. Elliott in the amount of
$89,518.00, which judgment was entered by the Supreme Court of Oneida County, State
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of New York, on or about October 14, 1982, and thereafter filed as a foreign judgment
with the Fifth Judicial District Court of Washington County, Utah.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.
The Plaintiff filed her Motion for Summary Judgment on February 14,

1995. (R. at 34, 64). When the Defendants did not respond to Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff filed its Notice to Submit for Decision on March 27,
1995 (R. at 72, 73), and the Court thereafter granted Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment on April 20, 1995. (R. at 77).
Defendants thereafter filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment on
September 4, 1995. The Defendants' Motion for Relief From Judgment was denied by
the District Court on the grounds that the Defendants' Motion for Relief from Judgment
was not timely, and that Defendants had made no good faith argument for a meritorious
defense on the merits. (R. at 127, 128).
C.

Statement of Facts.
The Plaintiff was granted judgment against the Defendant Lynn E. Elliott

on October 14, 1982 by the Supreme Court of Oneida County, State of New York, in the
amount of $89,518.00. (R. at 53-55). Plaintiff's judgment was filed as a foreign
judgment in the Fifth District Court of Washington County on October 31, 1985. (R. at
52). Plaintiff's foreign judgment was later filed with the clerk of the Fifth Judicial
District Court of Iron County on October 19, 1989. (R. at 52).
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2

Plaintiff moved to renew her judgment on October 4, 1993, and
complained of Defendants alleging certain fraudulent conveyances and alleging that the
Defendants' professional corporation known as Lynn Edward Elliott, A.I.A., P.C., was
the alter ego of the Defendant Lynn E. Elliott. (R. at 8).
On January 3, 1995, the District Court dismissed the Plaintiffs Complaint
when neither Defendants nor Plaintiff appeared at the scheduling conference. (R. at 21).
On or about January 13, 1995, Plaintiff moved to set aside the dismissal and reschedule
the scheduling conference. (R. at 24). Plaintiffs motion was submitted for decision on
or about January 26, 1995, there being no response to the Plaintiffs motion by the
Defendants. (R. at 26). On January 31, 1995, the matter was set for scheduling
conference to be held February 21, 1995. (R. at 32).
After the Court had set the matter for a Scheduling Conference, Plaintiff
filed her Motion for Summary Judgment with accompanying memorandum on
February 14, 1995. (R. at 34, 64). At the time of the scheduling conference, the court
ordered that within 30 days Defendants respond to the Plaintiffs Complaint, and file a
response to the pending Motion for Summary Judgment. (Transcript of November 6,
1995 hearing on Defendants' Motion for Relief from Judgment, pp. 8-10.)
When the Defendants did not respond to the Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment within 30 days, the Plaintiff filed a Notice to Submit for Decision on
or about March 27, 1995, and on that same date caused to be mailed in the United States
10182.1
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first class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the Notice to Submit for
Decision to counsel for Defendants. (R. at 72-73). The court thereafter granted
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on April 20, 1995. (R. at 77).
Counsel for Plaintiff filed a Notice of Entry of Order Granting Summary
Judgment on or about June 14, 1995, and mailed a true and correct copy of the Notice of
Entry of Order Granting Summary Judgment in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to
counsel for Defendant. (R. at 82-83).
Defendants thereafter filed their Motion for Relief from Judgment
approximately three months later on September 14, 1995 on the grounds of mistake,
inadvertance, surprise or excusable neglect. (R. at 104). Following oral argument on
Defendants' Motion for Relief from Judgment, the court ruled that Defendants' Motion
for Relief under Rule 60 was filed untimely, and that the Defendants' arguments on the
merits were erroneous, contrary to law, and that no good faith argument existed for a
meritorious defense. (R. at 127-128).
V.

Summary of Arguments,
The District Court properly denied the Defendants' Motion for Relief from Judg-

ment. The District Court has considerable discretion in rulings made pursuant to Rule
60(b), Utah R. Civ. P. That rule requires that any motion be made within a reasonable
time, and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than three months after judgment. In
the present case, the Defendants' Motion for Relief from Judgment was filed pursuant to
10182.1
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Rule 60(b)(1), but was filed more than three months after entry of judgment. In fact, the
Defendants did not file their Motion for Relief from Judgment until the eve of three
months after receiving the Notice of Entry of Judgment. As a result, the Defendants'
motion is barred by the express provisions of Rule 60(b), Utah R. Civ. P.

Argument
The District Court Correctly Denied the Defendants' Motion
for Relief From Judgment.
The District Court properly denied the Defendants' Motion for Relief from
Judgment1. In support of their Motion for Relief from Judgment, the Defendants had the

x

The trial court is vested with discretion in granting or denying a Motion for Relief from
Judgment. In fact, Utah Supreme Court had stated as follows:
The trial court is endowed with considerable latitude of discretion in granting
or denying a motion to relieve a party from the final judgment under Rule
60(b)(1), U.R.C.P., and this Court will reverse the trial court only where an
abuse of this discretion is clearly established.... The rule that the courts will
incline towards granting relief to a party who has not had the opportunity to
present his case, is ordinarily applied at the trial court level, and this court will
not reverse the determination of the trial court merely because the motion
could have been granted.
State By and Through the Dept. of Social Serv. v. Musselman. 667 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah
1983), quoting Airkem Intermountain Inc. v. Panker. 513 P.2d 429 (Utah 1973). See also
Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989) (trial court is afforded broad discretion
ruling on a Motion for Relief from Judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b), and its
determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.
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burden to show that their failure to defend Plaintiff's Motion was the result of excusable
neglect, that their Motion to Set Aside Judgment was timely, and that they have a
meritorious defense to the action. State Bv and Through the Depart. Social Serv. v.
Musselman. 667 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah 1983). Because the Defendants have
demonstrated no excusable neglect, because Defendant's Motion for Relief from
Judgment was not timely, and because the Defendants have not demonstrated a
meritorious defense to Plaintiff's action, the Defendants' motion was appropriately
denied.
A. Failure to Show Mistake or Neglect.
Defendants have utterly failed to establish any mistake, inadvertence, or excusable
neglect. Defendants simply argue that they did not receive the Plaintiff's Notice to
Submit its Motion for Summary Judgment for Decision, and further that the Plaintiff did
not provide Notice of Entry of Judgment timely. However, as demonstrated below, the
Plaintiff did properly submit the matter for decision with appropriate notice to the
Defendant, and Plaintiff and Defendants had more than sufficient time following receipt
of the Notice of Entry of Judgment to move for relief from judgment within the time
period prescribed by Rule 60(b). Because Defendants wholly failed to comply with
Rule 60(b), and have offered no explanation whatever for their failure to do so, the
Defendants' Motion for Relief from Judgment was properly denied by the Court.
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B. Timeliness of Motion.
The Defendant's Motion for Relief from Judgment was made under Utah R. Civ.
P. 60(b)(1), alleging mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. (R. at 104).
Rule 60(b), Utah R. Civ. P., states in pertinent part as follows:
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect;
newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and
upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance
of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect;
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for
reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 months after
the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken . . .
In the present case, the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted on
April 20, 1995 (R. at 77) after submitting its Motion to Submit for Decision. (R. at 7273). The Defendants did not move for relief from judgment until September 14, 1995.
Thus, the Defendants did not file their Motion for Relief from Judgment until one
hundred sixty-seven (167) days following entry of judgment, and ninety-two (92) days
following the Notice of Entry of Order Granting Summary Judgment. As a result, the
Defendants' Motion for Relief from Judgment is barred by the express provisions of
Rule 60(b), requiring that any motion for relief from judgment based on mistake,
inadvertence, or excusable neglect, be brought within three months after entry of
judgment.
10182.1
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Defendants' request is further barred by Rule 60(b)'s requirement that any motion
be brought within a reasonable time, where the Defendants waited ninety (90) days
following Notice of Entry of Judgment to file their motion. As a result, the Defendants'
Motion for Relief from Judgment was properly denied.
The case law cited by Defendants, for the proposition that their Motion for Relief
from Judgment was improperly denied, actually supports the District Court's denial of the
Plaintiffs Motion. In Workman v. Nagle Construction Inc.. 802 P.2d 749 (Utah App.
1990) the Court of Appeals held that the prevailing parties' failure to notify opponents of
the entry of judgment did not make the judgment ineffective. The Defendants argued that
the judgment was not validly entered because the prevailing party did not notify them of
the entry of judgment pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(d). Id. at 751. While the court
did hold that the failure to give the required notice of entry of judgment is an important
factor in determining the timeliness of a post-judgment proceeding, the court held that the
failure to give such notice is only a factor "where an exact time limit is not prescribed"
by Rule 60(b). Id. Therefore, the court held that if a losing party has remained ignorant
of a judgment in part because the prevailing party has not complied with Rule 58(d), "the
resulting delay is more reasonable for purposes of Rule 60(b)(5) -(7)." Id. (Italics
added). Because Rule 60(b)(1) contains an exact time limit of 90 days, the basis for the
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court's relief from the order in Workman is not applicable to the present case.2 Thus,
where judgment was entered on April 20, 1995, and the Defendants did not file their
Motion for Relief from Judgment until September 14, 1995 (approximately 167 days
later) the Defendants cannot be relieved from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b).
The District Court's denial of the Defendants' Motion for Relief from Judgment is
also supported by the fact that Notice of Entry of Judgment was provided on or about
June 14, 1995 and Defendants still failed to file their Motion for Relief from Judgment
within the three month time frame, although the Defendants still had until July 20, or 36
additional days, following entry of judgment, to file their motion within the 90 day time
limit. Thus, notwithstanding the 3 month time limit under Rule 60(b), the Defendants did
not file their motion within a reasonable time after receiving Notice of Entry of
Judgment. See Heath v. Heath. 541 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1975) (trial court justified in
denying Rule 60(b) relief because of the lack of a timely request and long passage of time
before making such request.)

2

See also In re Bundv's Estate. Goddard et al. vs. Bundv. 121 Utah 299, 241 P.2d 462
(1952), wherein the court rejected the Appellant's contention that the lower court erred in
denying Appellant's motion under Rule 60(b) where appellant's counsel was out of town and
received no notice or copy of the findings from the court clerk who evidently failed to mail
such notice and findings to counsel's office. Rejecting the Appellant's contention that they
should be granted additional time in which to bring their motion, the court stated: "[Ujnder
Rule 58A(c) a judgment is complete and is deemed entered for all purposes when the same is
signed and filed, not when notice is received by the parties."
10182.1
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In short, the trial court properly held that the Defendants' Motion for Relief from
Judgment was not timely.
C.

Defense to Plaintiffs Action.
In addition to demonstrating that a judgment was entered against the

Defendants through excusable neglect and that their Motion to Set Aside the judgment
was timely, the Defendants must also demonstrate a meritorious defense to Plaintiff's
action. Musselman. 667 P.2d at 1055. Because the Defendants' Motion for Relief from
Judgment entirely fails to establish any such defense, the Defendants' Motion for Relief
from Judgment was properly denied.
The Defendants' Motion for Relief from Judgment, together with the
Defendants' argument on appeal, sets forth two bases upon which the Defendants allege a
defense to the Plaintiff's action, namely, that Plaintiffs claim is barred by the statute of
limitations and, that the court's allowance of attachment to the property of Defendant
Jean H. Elliott is inappropriate based on the allegation that Defendant Lynn E. Elliott
never owned an interest in said property. Because the above defenses, as alleged by the
Defendants, are unmeritorious the court appropriately denied the Defendants' Motion for
Relief from Judgment.
1.

Statute of Limitations.
Defendants argue that the effect of the summary judgment entered

by the court was the renewal of an 11-year old foreign judgment entered in the State of
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New York, and that the filing in Utah as a foreign judgment does not extend the
underlying statute of limitations. The Defendants' argument is without merit.
Plaintiff was granted judgment against the Defendant Lynn E.
Elliott on October 14, 1982, by the Supreme Court of Oneida County, State of New
York. Plaintiffs judgment was then filed as a foreign judgment in the Fifth District
Court of Washington County on or about October 31, 1985. Plaintiffs foreign judgment
was later filed with the Clerk of the Fifth District Court of Iron County on October 19,
1989. Plaintiff moved to renew its judgment on October 4, 1993. Pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §§ 78-22a-2(2) and (3) (1992), the Plaintiffs Judgment is not barred by the
statute of limitations. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-22a-2(2) and (3) (1992) state as follows:
* * *

(2) A copy of a foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with
an appropriate act of Congress or an appropriate act of Utah may be filed
with the clerk of any district court in Utah. The clerk of the district court
shall treat the foreign judgment in all respects as a judgment of a district
court of Utah.
(3) A foreign judgment filed under this chapter has the same effect
and is subject to the same procedures, defenses, enforcement, satisfaction,
and proceedings for reopening, vacating, setting aside, or staying as a judgment of a district court of this state.
Because a foreign judgment is subject to the same procedures, defenses and
proceedings of a judgment of the district court of this state, and is subject to enforcement
and satisfaction in like manner, the foreign judgment is governed by the Utah statute of
limitations, which statute of limitations begins to run upon filing of the foreign judgment.
10182.1
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See Pan Energy v. Martin. 813 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1991). In Pan Energy, the Supreme
Court stated that § 78-22a-2(2) "requires foreign judgments to be treated as if they were
local judgments once they have been filed with the clerk of the district court. Once filed,
the foreign judgment is subject to the same procedures to attack or enforce it as a Utah
judgment. Thus, because foreign judgments properly filed in Utah essentially become
Utah judgments under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, the Utah Statute of Limitations
applies to the enforcement of those judgments in Utah." Id. at 1144. (Italics added). The
court went on to hold that:
We agree with the approach taken by the Federal
Courts and hold that, at least for purposes of enforcement,
the filing of a foreign judgment under § 78-22a-2(2) creates
a new Utah judgment which is governed by the Utah Statute
of Limitations. Because Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-22 (1987)
establishes an 8-year statute of limitations for the
enforcement of judgments, foreign judgments in Utah must
also be governed by the 8-year statute of limitations, which
runs from the date of filing, (emphasis added).
Id.
The Defendants' contention that the method of enforcing a foreign
judgment must be the same as the foreign state's method,3 was expressly rejected by the

3

Defendants' argument also fails because the New York Statute of Limitations for the
collection and enforcement of a money judgment is 20 years. See N.Y. C.L.S. C.P.L.R.
§211.
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court in Pan Energy. Id. (rejecting the notion that the method of enforcing a foreign
judgment is based on the foreign state's method.)
As a result, the Utah Foreign Judgment Act "simply requires that foreign
judgments filed in this State be treated as local judgments in all respects, including the
applicable statute of limitations regarding enforcement." Id. As a result, the Defendants'
argument that filing of a foreign judgment cannot extend the statute of limitations is in
error. See Carter v. Carter, 349 S.E.2d 95 (Va. 1986). (The statute of limitations
imposed a limitation of 10 years for bringing an action on a foreign judgment, and 20
years for enforcing a domestic judgment. However, the court noted that once an action is
brought on a foreign judgment, it becomes a domestic judgment; thus, a foreign judgment
creditor may have as many as 30 years to enforce the judgment.) In short, the
Defendants have no meritorious defense to the renewal of judgment.
2.

Fraudulent Transfer.

Defendants contend that the District Court's order that the transfer of
property by Lynn H. Elliott to his wife Jean H. Elliott is void, permitting the Plaintiff to
attach to the real property of Jean H. Elliott, cannot be complied with as no transfer was
made between these defendants. See Corbett v. Fitzgerald. 709 P.2d 384 (Utah 1985).
Defendants' position misconstrues the trial court's Order and the basis of
that Order. The trial court found that the Defendant Lynn E. Elliott transferred property
to Defendant Jean H. Elliott when the Defendant Lynn E. Elliott signed an Earnest
10182 1
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Money Purchase Agreement, but thereafter caused the property to vest solely in the name
of his wife, Defendant Jean H. Elliott. Furthermore, the Defendant Lynn Elliott caused
his wife, Defendant Jean Elliott, to become the sole obligee under the terms of the Trust
Deed Note used to finance the purchase of the property at issue. Therefore, pursuant to
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, the District Court found that the Defendant Lynn
Elliott had transferred his beneficial interest in the property at issue. The District Court's
Finding is supported by Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-2(12) (1995) (defining transfer as "every
mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, or voluntary or involuntary, of
disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of
money, release, lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance"). See also Ned J.
Bowman & Co. v. White, 369 P.2d 962 (Utah 1962) (transfers between near relatives are
subject to rigid scrutiny).
The Defendants' argument that the District Court's Order is impossible to comply
with, because no transfer took place, is incorrect. Defendant Lynn E. Elliott transferred
property to his wife in violation of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act, based on the
parties' joint agreement to purchase the property at issue, and where the Defendant
Lynn E. Elliott attempted to avoid his obligation to the Plaintiff by causing the property
to vest and be titled solely in the name of his wife, Defendant Jean H. Elliott.
Because Defendants have not demonstrated a meritorious defense to Plaintiff's
action, the Court properly denied the Defendants' Motion for Relief from Judgment.
10182.1
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CONCLUSION
The District Court properly denied the Defendants' Motion for Relief from
Judgment on the basis that Defendants have not demonstrated mistake, excusable neglect
or inadvertence, and that Defendants did not file their Motion for Relief from Judgment
until 167 days following Entry of Judgment, and 92 days following the Notice of Entry of
Order Granting Summary Judgment. On that basis, this Court should uphold the District
Court's finding that the Defendants' Motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) was not timely.
Defendants have not established the existence of a meritorious defense to the
Plaintiffs Claims. Plaintiff did move to renew her judgment within the applicable eight
year statute of limitations, and on the further basis that the Defendants did cause property
to be transferred to Defendant Jean H. Elliott in order to defraud creditor's pursuant to
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.
Based on the foregoing, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court uphold
the District Court's denial of the Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Judgment and affirm
the decision of the District Court.
DATED this 3

day of January, 1997.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK, & McDONOUGH

MICHAEL R. SHAW
JOHN J. WALTON
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
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